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This paper provides an analysis of the two channels 
of regional integration: integration via markets and 
integration via agreements. Given that East Asia and 
Latin America are two fertile regions where both forms 
of integrations have taken place, the authors examine 
the experiences of these two areas. There are four related 
results. First, East Asia had been integrating via markets 
long before formal agreements were in vogue in the 
region. Latin America, by contrast, has primarily used 
formal regional trade treaties as the main channel of 
integration. Second, despite the relative lack of formal 
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regional trade treaties until recently, East Asia is more 
integrated among itself than Latin America. Third, from 
a purely economic and trade standpoint, the proper 
sequence of integrations seems to be first integrating 
via markets and subsequently via formal regional trade 
agreements. Fourth, regional trade agreements often 
serve multiple constituents. The reason why integrating 
via markets first can be helpful is because this can give 
stronger political bargaining power to the outward-
looking economic-oriented forces within the country.   
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1. Introduction 
 
During the last decade, we witnessed a major transformation in the global governance 
of international trade relationships.  The first development occurred in 1995 with the creation 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which is the foremost global institution governing 
the conduct of international trade.  Rules contained in the Uruguay Round which created the 
World Trade Organization are the most ambitious and comprehensive multilateral trade laws 
ever ratified by member countries and they provide an anchor and a set of norms for all 
contracting parties.  Paradoxically, parallel to the development of these multilateral rules since 
1995 is the second major development in international trade relationships—the proliferation 
of bilateral, regional and other preferential trade agreements among nations.  As the Doha 
Round of negotiations is currently indefinitely suspended, it is expected that regional and 
bilateral trade deals will become even more prevalent. 
  
The creation of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) such as Free Trade Areas 
(FTAs) is by no means new. But the sheer number and the speed with which these agreements 
have been negotiated in the past ten years are simply astonishing.  By 2005, all but one WTO 
member was trading under one or more PTAs (Limao 2005).  In this paper, we would like to 
analyze the recent history, characteristics and the political economy of regional and bilateral 
trade integration from the viewpoint of two core concepts: integration of markets vs. 
integration by agreements.  
 
As its name suggests, the concept of integration of markets focuses on the idea that 
economies can integrate among themselves through the use of the marketplace, i.e. allowing 
the private sector to be the vanguard of trade integration. This can also be described as 
regional integration via de facto agreements. More concretely, this means that the economies 
in a region trade intensively among themselves without explicit formal preferential trade 
agreements. To facilitate intra-regional trade without the help of regional legal trade 
agreements, some of the economies may pursue policies of unilateral domestic deregulation 
and trade liberalizations, while others may improve their infrastructure (such as ports and 
highways), streamline their custom procedures or pursue policies that may facilitate inward 
foreign direct investment.  In other words, even integration via the markets can entail the use 
of some business-friendly policies by individual economies, even though no legal regional 
trade treaties are signed by governments.   3
The second core concept is integration by agreements, which focuses on trade 
integration via the use of formal or de jure trade treaties.  This channel of integration 
emphasizes the primacy of legal instruments to further economic integration among countries.  
There is no doubt that these two instruments of integration are very much related and indeed 
ultimately they are complementary. Integration of neighboring markets without formal 
regional trade agreements can create uncertainty among businesses since the institutional 
foundations may not be sufficiently clear and transparent.  Integration by agreements can be 
vacuous if the underlying economic factors are not favorable for integration. Nonetheless, it is 
important to ask the following questions: Which instrument of integration is more successful 
and more fundamental in driving trade integration? Is there a logical sequence for 
policymakers to consider when examining these two channels of integration?  In this paper, 
we will examine these and other questions in detail. Furthermore, given that East Asia and 
Latin America are two fertile territories in which various forms of PTAs proliferate, we will 
use the experiences of these two regions extensively as useful illustrations for our work in this 
paper.  
 
To look ahead, using the experiences of East Asia and Latin America as our guide, our 
research on the topic of integration of markets vs. integration by agreements suggests four 
conclusions.  First, until fairly recently (say the late 1990s), East Asian countries have 
integrated among themselves primarily via the markets and not by formal, de jure trade 
agreements. In contrast, Latin America has a long history (since the 1960s) of legal trade 
treaties that attempt to bind themselves together. Second, using various indicators of trade and 
economic integration, it is clear that East Asian economies are much more integrated among 
themselves than the economies of Latin America. At least for the important cases of East Asia 
and Latin America, integration using the marketplace or via de facto agreements (together 
with business-friendly policies by individual countries) leads to more intense integration than 
de jure agreements. Third, from the viewpoint of policymakers who want to strengthen trade 
relationships regionally, this suggests that the proper sequencing of the two forms of 
integration should first be the freeing of the domestic private sectors which allow them to 
mature and to use the international markets to integrate, before establishing legal treaties to 
further deepen the relationships.  Lastly, from a political-economic standpoint, it can be seen 
from the examples in East Asia and Latin America that regional trade agreements often serve 
several constituents. Trade agreements are both economic agreements as well as foreign 
policy agreements.  Regional trade agreements can also be inward-looking or outward-  4
oriented. To keep the primary focus on the open-trade and economic objectives, it is thus 
important to first develop a thick market for exporters and traders, who can pressure the 
government to pay attention to the signals of the economic forces. We will use a generalized 
Nash bargaining analysis to illustrate this point.  In the next section, we provide a detailed 
overview of recent development of regional trade agreements in East Asia and in Latin 
America.  In section 3, we provide some information of the extent and characteristics of the 
trade integration in these two regions.  In section 4, we provide a simple analysis of trade 
policy implementation that illustrates how integration of markets first can lead to more 
successful trade connections than integration via trade agreements.  In section 5, we conclude.  
 
 
2. Regional Trade Agreements in East Asia and Latin America 
 
In the wake of the progress achieved in Europe and North America, regional 
cooperation has recently gained momentum all over the world. Regional cooperation is of 
course not an end in itself but has to be considered as a way of enhancing economic growth 
and development. Most of the industrial and developing countries have concluded some 
regional trade and investment agreements. 
 
Compared to other international regions, for instance Latin America, Asia lagged in 
concluding formal trade agreements as East Asian countries have been more supportive of an 
open multilateral system. The Asian regional integration can be regarded as a de facto 
regional integration even though recently, by the end of 1990s, most East Asian countries 
have showed strong interest about de jure regionalism. However, the momentum for formal 
regional integration has been accompanied by the proliferation of bilateral FTAs not only 
within Asia but also with extra-regional countries, in particular with Latin America. 
 
Latin American countries adopted formal/de jure regional integration in the early 
1990s, such as NAFTA or MERCOSUR, but in addition to these sub-regional schemes, 
various bilateral FTAs have emerged both among Latin American countries and with the 
extra-regional countries by the end of 1990s. 
 
It is noteworthy that, given different choices of regional integration, intra-regional 
trade in Latin America is much less than that of East Asian countries.  We will highlight this   5
contrast of trade integration in section 3.  First let us next discuss the recent history of free 
trade agreements in East Asia and Latin America.  
 
2.1 Trends of Free Trade Areas in East Asia 
  
It is generally recognized that the FTA of ASEAN (The Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations) countries signed in 1992 was the starting point of East Asian regionalism. 
However, in the Asia-Pacific region, regional cooperation took shape as APEC (Asia-Pacific 
Economic cooperation) at the end of the 1980s. APEC
1 is not a regional trade agreement, but 
a unique form of economic cooperation for promoting trade and investment liberalization, 
economic and technical cooperation among Asia-Pacific countries. Although APEC is not an 
FTA in legal terms, it has a plan to achieve free trade in the region. At the APEC Summit 
Meeting in Bogor, Indonesia in 1994, the leaders adopted the “Bogor goal”, where they 
announced their commitment to complete trade and investment liberalization by 2010 in the 
case of industrial country members and by 2020 in the case of developing country members. 
At Osaka in November 1995, an agreement was reached on a set of fundamental principles to 
bring about the liberalization of trade and investment. If the “Bogor goals” are realized and 
the commitments of the member countries are fully implemented, APEC countries can enjoy a 
substantial welfare improvement through free trade opportunities in the region, without 
creating formal trade agreements. APEC adopted an “open regionalism” as the underlying 
paradigm i.e. with the intention of sharing benefits of free trade with non-members and thus 
trying to comply with the most favored nation (MFN) principal of the WTO. The work of 
APEC in trade liberalization did not achieve much success. However, it should not be viewed 
as a failure of “open regionalism”, but rather the result of the diversification of the APEC 
agenda, which now includes such topics as anti-terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. 
 
In the late 1990s, Asian economies appeared to seek another path for regional 
integration, namely Free Trade Areas (FTAs) in the subset of the Asia-Pacific region. ASEAN 
country members (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) have 
taken action toward trade liberalization. In 1992, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was 
set up formally to realize a free trade area within 15 years beginning 1 January 1993.  In 
                                                           
1 The original 12 members that participated in the first APEC meeting in Camberra I 1989 were Japan, Korea, six 
ASEAN countries, the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Later its membership expanded to 21 economies 
including China, Russia and Mexico.   6
September 1994, the time frame was shortened to 10 years with the aim of achieving the 
AFTA goals by 2003. The membership has been expanded to ten countries to include 
Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia. ASEAN countries agreed to eliminate tariffs among 
the original six members by 2010 and for new members by 2015. Moreover, the leaders of 
ASEAN announced that they aimed to transform AFTA into an ASEAN Economic 
Community by 2020. Individual countries in ASEAN pursue separate FTAs, which may affect 
cooperation among the ASEAN countries as a whole. Singapore has signed FTAs with New 
Zealand, Japan, Australia and the US, and Thailand has concluded an FTA with Australia.  
 
Although the ASEAN economy and trade volume is small compared to major trading 
blocs, ASEAN became the target of FTAs inside and outside the region. More recently, there 
have been agreements to study FTAs for broader groups. China has proposed an FTA between 
China and ASEAN country members. However, the ASEAN countries put forward an 
ASEAN+3 (including China, Japan and Korea). India also has agreed on a framework of 
comprehensive economic partnership with ASEAN. 
 
Despite the rise of regionalism in East Asia, regional integration has not long been 
prevalent in Northeast Asian countries
2. So far, Northeast Asian countries have not been part 
of any formal trading areas. There is now some willingness to form FTAs on bilateral sub-
regional levels. Korea took the first step in policy shift to free trade agreements. The Korean 
government decided to pursue FTAs with its trading partners at the Ministerial Committee on 
International Economic Policy in 1998. Chile was chosen as the first partner for the 
negotiation of an FTA because of the small size of the bilateral trade and distance between the 
two countries. Korea’s second FTA was with Singapore, also a country with a relatively small 
bilateral trade volume and less sensitive products. The Korean government is currently 
undertaken formal negotiation with Japan but the process is not easy. Japan is targeted for a 
short-term conclusion. The FTA with ASEAN is considered for mid-term, and the US, China 
and EU for the long run. Currently, Korea is involved with “simultaneous multi-track” 
negotiations with Japan, ASEAN and Canada. Joint studies for bilateral FTAs are being 
conducted for India, Mexico, Russia and MERCOSUR.  
 
                                                           
2 There are different geographical definitions of Northeast Asia. The broadest definition would include China, 
Japan, North and South Korea, Mongolia, Hong Kong, Taiwan and the Russian Far East and Siberia. This paper, 
concentrates on the three major Northeast Asian economies i.e. China, Japan and South Korea.   7
Japan has also begun to study the potential of FTAs in the late 1990s. The initial 
motivation was to defend export market from the regional agreements of other countries. In 
particular, since the NAFTA greatly affected the Japanese export performance in the region. 
Japan first thought an FTA with Mexico but negotiations with the Mexican government did 
not progress smoothly. The first FTA signed by Japan was a “New-age” free-trade agreement
3 
with Singapore in October 2002. The agreement included promoting mutual recognition on 
some licensing procedures and increasing worker mobility between the two countries. In 
2004, Japan finally agreed on a FTA with Mexico. Japan also concluded the FTA negotiations 
with the Philippines in 2004. Currently, Japan is undertaken official negotiations on FTA with 
Korea and Malaysia. Negotiations for an FTA with Indonesia are also expected to follow and 
formal negotiation with ASEAN started in April 2005.  
 
China joined the WTO in 2001 and is in the process of meeting its WTO obligations. 
This is why China’s interest in regional trade agreements is limited. However, China also took 
initiative in an FTA with ASEAN and has made progress in these negotiations. At a summit 
meeting held in Phnom Penh in 2002, the leaders of China and ASEAN countries announced 
the signing of a framework agreement with the objective to establish a FTA within ten years. 
China, Japan and Korea have also been discussing and investing the feasibility of a trilateral 
FTA. Separately, Japan and Korea have announced that they will conclude a bilateral FTA by 
the end 2005.  A China and Korea bilateral FTA may be the next one. China is hesitant to 
form a FTA with Japan and competes with Japan in the race for FTAS with ASEAN. It seems 
that China is ahead in a FTA with ASEAN as a group, but with regard to FTAs with 
individual ASEAN countries, Japan is further along. China is also seeking FTAs with Chile, 
New Zealand. Table 1 gives an overview of the intra-regional and extra-regional arrangements 
in East Asia. 
 
These are manifestations of a real willingness in East Asia toward closer regional 
cooperation. While ASEAN is often presumed to be the most important economic cooperation 
in the region, its impact on promoting intra-regional trade and investment has been limited. 
The initiation of FTAs was soon followed by the 1997 financial crisis affecting the region. 
Since then, paradoxically, the regional financial proposals are moving faster than any serious 
                                                           
3 The « New Age » Partnership goes beyond a traditional free trade agreement. It focuses on new issues such as: 
“rules governing foreign investment, e-commerce regulations, trade in services, harmonization of technical 
standards, sanitary and phyto-sanitary regulations, and the streamlining of customs procedures” Hertel, Walsley 
and Itakura (2001).   8
intention of regional economic cooperation
4. Traditionally, trade arrangements are most 
prominent regional groupings and, precede any financial integration. The European Monetary 
Union started with a customs union, and developed into a single currency full-fledged 
economic area. In comparison, the relationship between the economic and financial 
components of the East Asian regional process is ill defined. There now appears to be little or 
no coordination between economic and financial initiatives.  
 
In any case (economic or financial cooperation), Northeast Asian economies are 
expected to play a key role in regional integration. Further, a change in the attitudes of Japan 
and China is emerging. Both countries seem to be more resolute about a regional grouping 
than before. A shift of the center of gravity of political initiatives toward closer economic and 
financial cooperation has been perceivable. Given the slow progress within AFTA and the 
importance of the Northeast Asian countries in terms of size and weight in the Asian 
economy, a free trade arrangement between China, Japan and Korea could be achieved prior 
to wider agreements in the style of ASEAN+3. Furthermore, since it is difficult to expect an 
East Asia FTA in which at least one of the three major Northeast Asian countries does not 
participate, a de facto Northeast Asia cooperation is a necessary condition for an East Asian 
integration. Thus, a China-Japan-Korea cooperation is crucially important for the formal 
economic integration of both Northeast and East Asia.  
                                                           
4 The new international environment and the Asian currency crisis have created a strong impetus for regional 
financial cooperation and have provided Asian countries with a common interest, which has led to the Chiang 
Mai Initiative (CMI) agreement (May 2000) on bilateral swaps and discussions of the possibility of creating a 
monetary union among the ASEAN+3 as a long-run objective. More recently, at the informal ASEAN+3 Finance 
and Central Bank Deputies’ Meeting held in Tokyo on 13 November 2002, Korea made a proposal to discuss 
regional bond market development under the ASEAN+3. In furtherance of this proposal, Japan presented a 
comprehensive approach to foster bond markets in Asia, the “Asian Bond Markets Initiative” at an ASEAN+3 
informal session held in Chiang Mai on December 2002.   9
Table 1: Economic Cooperation Agreements in East Asia   
           
                  Intra-Regional  Year of in force      Type of agreement            Status 
Multi-Countries Agreements          
Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) 1976  Partial  Scope Implemented 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)  1992  Free Trade Agreement  Implemented 
East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA)  2000  Free Trade Agreement  Proposed 
China-Japan-Korea Free Trade Area  2000  Free Trade Agreement  Proposed 
APTA-Accession of China  2002  Partial Scope Accession  Implemented 
Japan-ASEAN Closer Economic Partnership 2002  Partial  Scope 
Signed and 
realization by 10 yrs 
Singapore-EFTA (Iceland, Norway, 
Switzerland)   2003  Free Trade Agreement  Implemented 
ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA)  2003  Partial Scope 
Signed and 
realization by 2010 
ASEAN-India Regional Trade Agreement  2003  Econ Integration Agreement  Signed 
ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Area  2004  Partial Scope  On-going negotiations 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership  2006  Free Trade Agreement  Signed 
Korea-EFTA (Iceland, Norway, Switzerland)  2006  Free Trade Agreement  Signed 
           
Bilateral Agreements          
Laos-Thailand 1991  Partial  Scope  Implemented 
Singapore-New Zealand  2001  Econ Integration Agreement  Implemented 
Singapore-Japan  2002  Free Trade Agreement  Signed 
Singapore-Australia  2003  Free Trade Agreement  Implemented 
Japan-Korea  2003  Free Trade Agreement  On-going negotiations 
Thailand-India 2003  Econ  Integration Agreement  Implemented 
China-Hong Kong (CEPA)  2004  Econ Integration Agreement  Signed 
China-Macao  2004  Econ Integration Agreement  Signed 
Korea-Chile  2004  Econ Integration Agreement  Signed 
Singapore-United States  2004  Econ Integration Agreement  Signed 
Hong Kong-New Zealand  2005  Econ Integration Agreement  On-going negotiations 
Japan-Mexico 2005  Econ  Integration  Agreement On-going  negotiations 
Thailand-Australia 2005  Econ  Integration Agreement  Implemented 
Thailand-New Zealand  2005  Free Trade Agreement  Signed 
Singapore-Canada  2006  Free Trade Agreement  On-going negotiations 
Singapore-Chile  2006  Free Trade Agreement  On-going negotiations 
Singapore-India  2005  Free Trade Agreement  On-going negotiations 
Singapore-Jordan  2005  Free Trade Agreement  On-going negotiations 
Singapore-Korea  2006  Free Trade Agreement  On-going negotiations 
Singapore-Mexico  2006  Free Trade Agreement  On-going negotiations 
Singapore-Panama  2006  Free Trade Agreement  On-going negotiations 
China-Chile  2006  Free Trade Agreement  On-going negotiations 
Japan--Canada 2006  Econ  Integration  Agreement On-going  negotiations 
Japan-Malaysia  2006  Free Trade Agreement  On-going negotiations 
Korea-Australia 2006  Econ  Integration Agreement  On-going negotiations 
Korea-New Zealand  2006  Econ Integration Agreement  On-going negotiations 
Korea-United States  2007  Econ Integration Agreement  On-going negotiations 
Korea-Mexico 2007  Econ  Integration  Agreement On-going  negotiations 
Japan-Chile 2007  Econ  Integration  Agreement On-going  negotiations 
Malaysia-United States  2007  Econ Integration Agreement  On-going negotiations 
Philippines-United States  2007  Econ Integration Agreement On-going  negotiations 
      
Sources: WTO web data and various info from the web.       10
2.2  Origins of the New Asian Regionalism 
 
Before 1997, most Asian economists considered East Asian economic cooperation 
(through trade and investment) as an example of a successful de facto regionalism i.e. 
explained by the play of pure economic forces. However, the financial crisis of 1997-98 
demonstrated the weaknesses of informal regional cooperation and gave East Asians a strong 
impetus to search for a regional mechanism that could forestall future crisis. This search is 
now gathering momentum and opening the door to possibly significant de jure integration in 
East Asia.  
 
  The Asian financial crisis is often regarded as the outbreak for the rise in regionalism 
in East Asia. The crisis and its subsequent contagion to a number of economies in Northeast 
and Southeast Asia painfully demonstrated that the East Asian economies were closely related 
and a resolution to the crisis could require a regional cooperation. A rising sense of East Asian 
identity has emerged since the crisis. After the proposal to create an Asian Monetary Fund 
(AMF) failed to lead to progress, the leaders of ASEAN responded by inviting China, Korea 
and Japan to join in an effort to seek economic cooperation in the region. The ASEAN+3 
Summit in November 1999 released a “Joint Statement on East Asian Cooperation” that 
covers a wide range of possible areas for regional cooperation. In the early 2000s, other new 
economic situations - such as the quick recovery and recurring growth in Korea, the 
emergence of China as a fast post-crisis growing economy and the continuing stagnant state of 
Japan - gave rise to a new Asian economic regionalism and FTAs. It is noteworthy that FTAs 
projects are numerous and proliferating at startling speed. These include regional agreements 
as well as bilateral treaties
5. 
  
Although the financial crisis might have been the direct cause, a number of additional 
factors contributed to the breakthrough and proliferation of the policy-led regionalism in East 
Asia. First, regionalism was the natural result of decades of fast growth and a number of 
economic restructuring and industrial transformations in East Asia, particularly in Northeast 
Asia (with the emergence of Japan as a major industrial power in the 1960s, and rapid growth 
of the newly industrializing economies of Northeast and Southeast Asia in the late 1970s and 
1980s). These economic developments have created a new center of East Asia economic 
                                                           
5 Most intra-regional trade agreements of Asian countries are FTAs, the effect of which is to eliminate trade 
barriers between members. Following the Japanese, the term “Economic Partnership Agreement” (EPA) is also 
used, which intends to imply that the scope of the agreement is broader than the elimination of barriers of trade 
in goods.   11
power that has begun to compete with North America and Europe in terms of its contribution 
to world output and world trade. Second, it was the result of a “benign neglect” from 
international organizations such as the IMF in the aftermath of the Asian crisis (Tran Van 
Hoa, 2002). East Asian economic policy makers perceived international institutions and the 
main global trading powers (especially, the US) fell short in their support for the region. That 
is why to escape this crisis, countries initially attempted some kind of “go-it-alone” strategy 
(for example, uncontrolled devaluations, interruption of payments…). These countries were 
rapidly called to order by the IMF in the name of global world interest. The IMF’s reaction 
illustrated for regional policy makers not only the inefficiency of a “go it alone” strategy but 
also the lack of institutional regional coordination in Asia. Finally, the successful integration 
initiatives in other parts of the world, such as the EU and NAFTA, illustrated for academics 
and politicians the possibilities that deepening and widening economic cooperation could 
bring in East Asia. For a long time most East Asian countries, and in particular Japan, 
considered multilateral agreements (in the sense of WTO) alone sufficient to establish fair 
economic relationships. They were strongly encouraged by the USA in that way of thinking. 
However, when the USA itself decided to engage in regional agreements with first Canada 
and then Mexico in 1992, the Asian countries started to dread being left isolated between what 
seemed to be possible future trade blocs. Understanding the logic of NAFTA and EU was a 
lesson to Asian countries: regional agreements are a mix of political and economic objectives. 
Once traditional barriers to trade and investment are eliminated, there are still many other 
impediments to abolish. The regional integration is in fact a result of economic forces and 
political willingness. In the case of East Asia, political issues have long been major obstacles 
to regional economic cooperation. Nonetheless, prospect for de jure regionalism in East Asia 
is not totally disappeared as new approaches and initiatives are in recent times put forward by 
the regional states. East Asian regionalism is undergoing a phase of new interpretation. It is 
no longer limited in an economic sense. Growing interdependence and tightening financial 
links are not sufficient to make this regionalization more consistent: strategic thinking is being 





                                                           
6 This has been done at the Chinese initiative, with Japan trying to follow. Beijing is increasingly driving East 
Asia’s agenda. China’s suggestion to extend invitation to India, New Zealand, and Australia, but not to the USA 
for the East Asian Summit meeting in November 2005 in Malaysia was accepted by the members of ASEAN+3, 
and it reflects China’s growing influence over East Asia’s emerging regional architecture.   12
2.3  Trends of Free Trade Areas in Latin America 
 
Free trade is not a new concept in Latin America. Globally, we can consider three 
phases of FTA process in Latin America.  
 
First stage (1960s): FTAs created in the context of import substitution industrialization  
 
Since the 1940s regional economic integration in Latin America was considered as an 
instrument of promoting economic growth and industrialization. In the 1960s, there were a 
number of arrangements in order to promote regional economic integration, most of which 
met with limited success. The Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) created in 
1960 incorporated the inward-looking import substitution orientation for Latin American 
industrialization policies. In order to deepen the import substituting industrialization process, 
those countries which had small markets tried to reach economies of scale through the 
preferential opening of their markets. In 1969, The Andean Pact was conducted as a sub-
regional agreement within LAFTA. LAFTA and the Andean Pact were not capable of 
increasing trade in the region. These agreements were negotiated on a product-by-product 
approach instead of covering all sectors of the economy. The Central American Common 
Market (CACM) formed by Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras followed an 
inward-oriented trade strategy but was more successful in promoting intra-regional trade. The 
objective was to reach a common market which would provide a preferential market for 
import substituting industries. During the 1970s, the CACM suffered a crisis and in 1986, the 
collapse of the Central American clearing mechanism marked the disintegration of the 
CACM. 
 
The 1980s were a decade of major economic transformation for the Latin American 
economies: Latin American countries started drastic policy reforms based on “neo-
liberalism”, abandoning interventionist strategy that had brought the region’s financial and 
economic crisis. This context led to the liberalization of most Latin American trade policies 
and to the adoption of outward-oriented trade policies coupled with economic stabilization 
and the privatization of public firms. The Latin American countries made revisions to the 
trade agreements of the previous period with the idea of renewing the process of regional 
integration in the sense of taking into account the need of Latin American economies to 
compete in the international market and to improve market access for their exports. Bhagwati   13
(1992) considered that as a “second regionalization based on open trade compared to the first 
regionalization based on protection”.  
 
Second stage (1990s): Intra-regional FTAs to complement and support the economic 
liberalization process 
 
The Andean Pact was reviewed in order to take into account not only trade in goods 
but also liberalization in other areas. In spite of this integration effort, the level of intra-
regional trade remained quite low. 
 
In March 1991, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay signed the Asuncion Treaty 
which established MERCOSUR. Later, Chile and Bolivia have joined MERCOSUR as 
associate members in the framework of an ECA. 
 
At the same time, there has also been a proliferation of bilateral or trilateral regional 
initiatives. The pioneering bilateral trade agreement between Chile and Mexico went into 
force in January 1992. The agreement was officially called ECA
7 17 of ALADI (Latin 
American Integration Association). One year before the Mexico-Chile ECA was ratified, the 
Argentina-Chile ECA went into force, which was called ECA 16 of ALADI. These two ECAs 
as well as many other trade agreements among Latin American countries were negotiated in 
the framework of ALADI. This is why the ALADI can be regarded as a kind of “umbrella” 
agreement facilitating the negotiation and realization of regional trade arrangements. 
 
In 1994, the bilateral trade agreement between Canada and the US was extended to 
Mexico in order to form the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Besides multi-
country economic integrations such as NAFTA and MERCOSUR, many bilateral agreements 
have emerged in Latin America since the early 1990s. Particularly two Latin American 
countries, Chile and Mexico, have independently pursued bilateral FTAs with other countries 
in Latin America. After the NAFTA was established, Mexico extended FTAs to several 
countries of Latin America. In 1995, the trilateral FTA with Colombia and Venezuela was 
negotiated to form the G3 Agreement (El Grupo de los Tres). FTAs with Costa Rica and 
Bolivia went into force in 1995 and FTA with Nicaragua in 1998. Later, Mexico started the 
                                                           
7 Economic Complementation Agreements (ECAs) basically cover trade of goods although they give the 
possibilities of future negotiation of other areas.   14
negotiation with three other countries of Central America together (El Salvador, Guatemala 
and Honduras) and, individually with Panama, Ecuador, Peru, Belize, Trinidad and Tobago, 
and Dominican Republic.  
 
As for Chile, liberalization through bilateral FTAs was assumed to be one of the most 
effective instruments of trade policy for a small country such as Chile. Chile established 
bilateral ECAs with Argentina and Mexico and started FTAs in the ALADI framework with 
Venezuela and Bolivia in 1993, Colombia in 1994, Ecuador in 1995, MERCOSUR in 1996, 
and Peru in 1998. Chile also initiated bilateral negotiation with Canada which went into force 
in 1997, and with the Central American Common Market in 1999.  
 
In this way, Mexico and Chile have been converting into “hubs” of FTAs in Latin 
America from the mid 1990s.  
 
Third stage (end of 1990s-2000s): Inter-regional FTAs  
 
  By the end of 1990s, both Mexico and Chile started to look for establishing FTAs with 
extra-regional countries. This trend can be considered as the new trade policy of these 
countries in order to diversify economic links with major extra-regional countries like 
European or Asian economies. This is why Mexico and Chile are assumed to be “hubs” that 
involves not only in Latin America, but also inter-regional FTAs connecting existing or newly 
establishing integration schemes in other regions. For instance, Chile formed FTAs with 
Canada, the US and Korea. It signed the Association Agreement with the EU in 2002. Mexico 
formed an FTA with the EU and Israel by the end of 2000. The two countries showed also 
strong interests in forming bilateral framework with Asian countries in particular. For 
instance, Chile signed FTA with Korea in 2002 and this is the first FTA between Asia and 
Latin America. Japanese government has already started negotiation with Mexican 
government about future economic cooperation that covers FTA between the two countries.  
 
Other negotiations are ongoing, focusing on trade relationship with the Unites States. 
Recently, some of the region’s countries such as Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama and Peru, 
centred on trade links with the United States, showing that the integration process is in a 
change in Latin America. The Dominican republic-Central America-USA FTA has come into 
effect in all member countries, except in Costa Rica, where it is in the process of being   15
ratified.  The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela withdrew from the Andean Community 
concluded negotiations for a FTA with the United States. Table 2 illustrates effective regional 
arrangements in Latin America.  
 
It is noteworthy that these movements in Latin America towards bilateral FTAs could 
have significant influences on the recent movement in Asia for establishing bilateral FTA, 
thus accelerating initiatives for bilateral FTA in Asia-Pacific. 
 
 
Table 2: Economic Cooperation Agreements in Latin America    
      
                      Intra-Regional  Year of in force      Type of agreement       Status 
Multi-Countries Agreements          
CACM (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, 1961  Customs  Union  Implemented 
   Nicaragua)          
CARICOM (incl. 15 Caribbean countries)  1973/97 Customs  Union  and EIA  Implemented 
LAIA (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Cuba, 1981  Partial  Scope  Implemented 
   Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Urugary, 
Venezuela)          
Andean (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, 
Venezuela) 1988  Customs  Union  Implemented 
MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay; 1991/05  Customs  Union and EIA  Implemented 
   Venezuela joined 2006)          
NAFTA (Canada, Mexico, United States)  1994  Econ Integration Agreement Implemented 
G3 (Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela)  1995  Free Trade Agreement  Implemented 
Chile-MERCOSUR 1996  Econ  Integration Agreement  Implemented 
Bolivia-MERCOSUR 1997  Econ  Integration Agreement  Implemented 
MERCOSUR-European Communities  1999  Cooperative Agreement  Implemented 
Mexico-European Communities  2000  Econ Integration Agreement  Implemented 
Mexico-EFTA 2001  Econ  Integration Agreement  Implemented 
Mexico-Central America  2001  Free Trade Agreement  Implemented 
Mexico-MERCOSUR  2002  Econ Integration Agreement  Signed 
Chile-European Communities  2003  Free Trade Agreement  Signed 
Peru-MERCOSUR  2003  Econ Integration Agreement  Signed 
MERCOSUR-India 2003  Econ  Integration Agreement  Signed 
Chile-EFTA  2004  Econ Integration Agreement  Signed 
Dominican Rep.-Central America-United States  2006  Free Trade Agreement  Signed 
           
Bilateral Agreements          
Chile-Argentina 1991  Econ  Integration Agreement  Implemented 
Mexico-Argentina 1991  Econ  Integration Agreement  Implemented 
Chile-Mexico 1992/98 
EIA and Free Trade 
Agreement Implemented 
Chile-Bolivia 1993  Econ  Integration Agreement  Implemented 
Chile-Venezuela 1993  Econ  Integration Agreement  Implemented 
Chile-Colombia 1994  Econ  Integration Agreement  Implemented 
Mexico-Bolivia 1994/95 
EIA and Free Trade 
Agreement  Implemented 
Chile-Ecuador 1995  Econ  Integration Agreement  Implemented   16
Mexico-Costa Rica  1995  Free Trade Agreement  Implemented 
Mexico-Peru 1996  Econ  Integration Agreement  Implemented 
Chile-Canada  1997  Free Trade Agreement  Implemented 
Mexico-Nicaragua  1998  Free Trade Agreement  Implemented 
Chile-Peru 1998  Econ  Integration Agreement  Implemented 
Mexico-Israel  2000  Free Trade Agreement  Implemented 
Mexico-Cuba 2001  Econ  Integration Agreement  Implemented 
Mexico-El Salvador  2001  Free Trade Agreement  Implemented 
Mexico-Guatemala  2001  Free Trade Agreement  Implemented 
Mexico-Honduras  2001  Free Trade Agreement  Implemented 
Mexico-Brazil  2002  Econ Integration Agreement  Signed 
Chile-Costa Rica  2002  Free Trade Agreement  Implemented 
Chile-El Salvador  2002  Econ Integration Agreement  Implemented 
Costa Rica-Canada  2002  Free Trade Agreement  Signed 
Chile-Korea  2003  Econ Integration Agreement  Signed 
Mexico-Uruguay  2003  Free Trade Agreement  Signed 
El Salvador-Panama  2003  Free Trade Agreement  Signed 
Chile-United States  2004  Econ Integration Agreement  Signed 
      
Sources: WTO web data and various info from the web.     
 
 
2.4   Driving forces of the recent development of regionalism in Latin 
America 
 
The development of regionalism in Latin America in the 1990s can be explained by 
several factors (Hosono, A., Nishijima S., 2003). The most significant ones are the following: 
 
- Economic liberalization of the 1980s: Latin American countries started radical policy 
reforms in the middle of the 1980s, leaving behind interventionist policies responsible 
for economic crises in the 1980s. Upshots of these policy reforms were seen mostly in 
the trade and capital liberalization.    
 
- Increasing regionalism of the US: The US foreign trade policy had been based on a 
mix of multilateralism and bilateralism until the end of the 1980s. From then on, the 
US showed an inclination towards regionalism with the formation of NAFTA and 
APEC. In response to these changes in the US attitude towards regionalism, Latin 
American countries adopted different behaviors: 
 
• Some countries expressed strong impetus about joining FTA of Americas, on the US 
initiative and leadership;    17
• Other countries, such as Chile, started a negotiation to join NAFTA; 
• Southern Cone countries, such as Brazil and Argentina, formed a sub-regional 
integration i.e. MERCOSUR, to counterbalance against the regionalism of the US; 
• Mexico and Chile enhanced bilateral intra and extra-regional FTAs; 
• The Andean Community is recently going through a period of adjustment and 
redefinition following the withdrawal of Venezuela, the extend-membership to Chile 
and the signature by Colombia and Peru of bilateral trade agreements with the 
United States. 
  
The new trend of extra-regional integration in the 2000s, in particular the proliferation 
de bilateral FTAs, conducted by Mexico and Chile, could be explained as the natural result of 
the deepening and widening process of FTA. However, these two countries have different 
reasons for promoting their FTAs with extra-regional countries. Taking into account the 
dependency of Mexico on the US market after its participation to the NAFTA, Mexico 
showed an inclination to diversify and strengthen economic relationship with extra-regions 
through expanding bilateral FTAs. As for Chile, it is one of the most liberalized countries in 
the world, opting for unilateral trade liberalization. It is then very important for Chile to 
induce trade liberalization of partner countries within Latin America or outside the region. 
 
By examining the brief history of trade agreements in both East Asia and Latin 
America above, we can see the following: 
 
East Asia first integrated via the markets and then in the 1990s started 
integrating via agreements. Latin America since the 1960s has mainly 
used trade agreements as the primary channel for integration.  
 
It is then interesting to evaluate the depth of the trade integration for 
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3. Characteristics and Intensity of Trade Integration in East Asia and 
Latin America 
 
  In this section we will examine the characteristics and intensity of regional trade 
integration in both East Asia and Latin America.  Table 3 compares the degrees of intra-
regional trade for all goods in East Asia and Latin America over time.  The East Asian 
economies considered include ASEAN countries (Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) and North East Asian countries (China, Hong 
Kong, Japan, Macao, republic of Korea and Taiwan) while the Latin American economies 
include  ANDEAN countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela), 
MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, Venezuela is excluded due to new 
membership in 2006) and NAFTA countries (Canada, Mexico and United States).  
 
It can easily be seen that the East Asian economies are much more integrated among 
themselves than the Latin American economies, excluding Canada and the United States.  In 
2005, 50.5% of East Asian exports went to other East Asian economies.  The comparable 
figure for Latin America (LAIA including those countries in ANDEAN Community and 
MERCOSUR plus Chile and Mexico) was only 13.2%.  Trade integration in East Asia was 
already high before the 1997-98 Asian financial crises. In 1995, 48.7% of East Asian exports 
were intra-regional, as compared with 17.2% in Latin America.  One could assume that taking 
into account Northeast Asian countries, specially, China, Japan and Korea, could change 
results and produce very high level of integration comparing to Latin American countries. 
This is why it is interesting to compare ASEAN to Latin American countries with an 
additional distinction between Central and South America. Table 3 shows that, during the 
whole period under study, trade integration among ASEAN countries (25.2% in 2005) is 
higher than the trade integration among ANDEAN community (8.2% in 2005) or 
MERCOSUR countries (12.9% in 2005).  
 
Thus one can surmise that de facto trade agreements or integration via the markets 
were effective in helping East Asia integrate, while de jure trade agreements do not seem to 
lead to more intra-regional trade integration in Latin America. 
 
  Generally one may surmise that trade integration may tend to occur to a greater extent 
for manufactured goods. Furthermore, given the rising importance of trade in components and   19
parts, it is expected that integration via trade in components and parts should be even more 
intense (Yi, 2003; Ng and Yeats, 2003). Global and regional production sharing and vertical 
specialization have become increasingly important. In the next Table we wish to highlight 
intra-regional trade of manufactured goods and components and parts within these two 
regions for various years. Table 4 shows clearly that for both manufactured goods and 
components and parts, intra-regional trade is relatively more pronounced in East Asia than in 
Latin America.  48.5% of East Asian exports of manufactured goods were shipped to other 
East Asian economies in 2005.  The corresponding share for Latin America (LAIA) was only 
17.1%. However, if we compare ASEAN to ANDEAN and MERCOSUR countries, results 
are different: 25.1% of ASEAN exports of manufactured goods were shipped to other East 
Asian economies in 2005; the corresponding share for ANDEAN countries was 34.3% and 
20.2% for MERCOSUR.  As for parts and components, the share of East Asian intra-regional 
exports of components and parts amounted to 59.3% in 2005, as compared to 14.00% in Latin 
America (LAIA). But if we compare ASEAN to ANDEAN and MARCOSUR countries, 
results are different: 29.6% of ASEAN exports of parts and components were shipped to other 
East Asian economies in 2005, while the corresponding share for ANDEAN countries was 
39.5% and 22.6% for MERCOSUR.   
 
Table 3: East Asia and Latin America Intra-Regional Trade in Various Years   
              
       Share of Intra-Regional Exports in       Share of Intra-Regional Exports in    
            East Asia to the World (%)           Latin America to the World (%)    
Year  ASEAN  NE Asia  East Asia  ANDEAN  MERCOSUR  LAIA  NAFTA  LAC 
1985 18.7  23.3  34.2  2.6 5.5  10.0  42.9  46.1 
1990 19.0  27.8  39.8  4.2 8.9  10.9  41.3  44.5 
1995 24.9  34.5  48.7  12.1 20.5  17.2  46.0  50.5 
2000 23.0  34.5  47.3  9.1 20.9  13.1  55.7  58.8 
2005 25.2  39.2  50.5  8.2 12.9  13.2  55.8  57.2 
              
Notes: ASEAN includes Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam due to 
             missing data for Brunie, Laos and Myanmar. Cambodia and Vietnam are missing data in 1985-1995. 
           NE Asia includes China, Hong Kong, Japan, Macao, Korea Rep., and Taiwan.     
           East Asia includes those countries in ASEAN and NE Asia.       
           ANDEAN includes Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.       
           MERCOSUR includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay (Venezuela is excluded due to new 
             member in 2006).             
           LAIA includes those countries in ANDEAN and MERCOSUR plus Chile and Mexico.   
           NAFTA includes Canadia, Mexico and United States.         
           LAC includes all countries in LAIA and NAFTA.         
               
Source: Computations by authors based on UN COMTRADE Statistics.       
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Table 4: East Asia and Latin America Intra-Regional Trade of Manufactured Goods and  
Parts & Components in Various Years          
               
       Share of Intra-Regional Exports in       Share of Intra-Regional Exports in    
            East Asia to the World (%)           Latin America to the World (%)    
Year  ASEAN  NE Asia  East Asia  ANDEAN  MERCOSUR  LAIA  NAFTA  LAC 
            Manufactured Goods          
1985 22.1  19.0  25.7  13.5 7.8  18.4  46.7  50.9 
1990 19.9  25.5  35.4  14.6 10.5  17.0  43.1  47.0 
1995 26.3  32.3  46.0  39.3 26.5  19.6  47.8  53.7 
2000 23.3  33.0  44.9  33.2 27.0  13.0  55.5  59.8 
2005 25.1  38.3  48.5  34.3 20.2  17.1  54.3  58.9 
            Parts & Components          
1985 22.8  23.2  31.2  9.5 8.0  17.3  41.3  46.1 
1990 27.0  32.1  44.4  12.8 12.4  16.8  45.3  49.3 
1995 32.1  34.3  51.9  40.1 34.2  17.5  45.9  51.3 
2000 29.0  38.0  54.3  39.4 30.2  10.0  53.0  57.5 
2005 29.6  45.8  59.3  39.5 22.6  14.0  53.0  58.0 
               
Notes: Manufactured goods is defined as SITC 5+6+7+8-68 in Revision 2.       
           Parts & components include 75 items of parts in machinery, transport equipment and textiles & clothing. 
           Cambodia and Vietnam are missing data in 1985 to 1995 in East Asia.     
               
Source: Computations by authors based on UN COMTRADE Statistics.       
 
 
Table 4 also shows that the intensification of intra-regional trade in Latin America 
started in the 1990s, while the pace of trade integration started prior to the proliferation of 
formal regional trade agreements in East Asia.  In 1990, the shares of ASEAN intra-regional 
exports of manufactured goods and components and parts were 19.9% and 27.00%, 
respectively. The corresponding shares in Latin America were 14.6% and 12.8% for 
ANDEAN community and 10.5% and 12.4% for MERCOSUR countries.  
 
Essentially East Asian integration was driven by market conditions.  Integration via 
markets occurs before attempts to establish more formal regional trade agreements.  For Latin 
America, de jure trade agreements seem to have led to a slight acceleration of the pace of 
intra-regional trade. 
 
Another way we can analyze the intensity of regional trade integration is through the 











where Xij and Xwj are country i and world exports to country j; Xi and Xw are country i and 
world total exports. The numerator indicates the share of country i’s export to country j in 
total export of the country i, and the denominator indicates the share of world’s export to 
country j in its total export. If the bilateral trade intensity index has a value greater than one, 
the export of country i outperforms in country j. It implies that country j is relatively 
important to country i’s exports.  
 
In Table 5, we present calculations of the trade intensity indices for East Asian 
countries as well as some of their major trading partners for 2005. To further highlight their 
trade relationship, we also provide the overall trade matrix for the region.  The overall East 
Asia-East Asia trade index is 5.9, as compared to the Latin American (LAIA) trade index of 
3.6 (Table 6). For an in-depth analysis, we compare ASEAN index to ANDEAN and 
MERCOSUR countries. The ASEAN index is 7.2 while the indices for ANDEAN and 
MECOSUR are respectively 13.5 and 12.6. These results show highlight that trade integration 
is higher among Latin American countries participating to regional agreements. However, the 
regional point of view highlights a more pronounced integration in East Asia (5.9), with more 
recent and less regional trade agreements, compared to Latin America, including the United 
States and Canada (5.0).     22 
Table 5: Matrix of East Asian Trade in All Goods, 2005                
                        
                     Exporting Country                      
Partner (Importer)  Cambodia  China 
Hong 
Kong  Indonesia Japan  Korea Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Taiwan  Thailand  Vietnam  ASEAN  NE Asia  E Asia-12 
             Export Value in All Goods ($ million)              
Cambodia  0 536  497  94  78 144  109  8  303 331  915 556  1,985 1,586 3,571 
China  13  0 130,426  6,662 80,074 61,915  9,302  4,077  19,757 40,879  9,134  3,246 52,192  313,294  365,486 
Hong  Kong,  China  616  124,473  0  1,492 35,960 15,531  8,242  3,341  21,522 30,721  6,128  353 41,694  206,685  248,379 
Indonesia  2 8,350  1,265  0 9,214 5,046  3,322  476  22,103 2,336  3,960  469  30,332  26,211  56,543 
Japan  25 83,986  15,304  18,049  0 24,027  13,184  7,206  12,532 14,481 15,029  4,340 70,366  137,798  208,164 
Korea,  Rep.  25 35,108  6,540  7,086 46,630  0  4,739  1,391  8,052  5,575  2,250  664 24,207  93,852  118,060 
Malaysia  9 10,606  2,419  3,431 12,531  4,608  0  2,459  30,385  4,154  5,685  1,028 42,998  34,319  77,316 
Philippines  2 4,688  2,635  1,419 9,057 3,220  1,974  0  4,184 4,220  2,050  829  10,459  23,820  34,279 
Singapore  10 16,632  6,046  7,837 18,436  7,407  22,009  2,707  0  7,656  7,459  1,917 41,939  56,177  98,116 
Taiwan,  China  4 16,550  6,769  2,475 43,578 10,863  3,912  1,888  8,976  0  2,694  935 20,884  77,760  98,644 
Thailand  17  7,819  3,001  2,246  22,451  3,381 7,586  1,169  9,402  3,718  0  863  21,284 40,370 61,654 
Vietnam  42 5,644  1,308  678 3,592 3,432  1,160  312  4,421 4,057  2,357  0 8,971  18,032  27,003 
ASEAN  83 54,276  17,170  15,706 75,359 27,237  36,162  7,131  70,798 26,472  22,426  5,662  157,968  200,514  358,482 
NE  Asia  682 260,117  159,039  35,764 206,243 112,336  39,380  17,903  70,839  91,655  35,235  9,538 209,343  829,390 1,038,733 
East  Asia  (12)  765 314,393  176,209  51,470 281,602 139,573  75,542  25,034  141,637 118,127  57,662  15,200 367,310 1,029,904 1,397,214 
EU  (27)  593  145,613  42,942  10,347 87,819 44,354  16,614  7,014  27,907 22,124 15,019  5,547 83,041  342,851  425,892 
LAC  (13)  1,410 192,173  53,088  11,478 158,201  54,543  29,879  7,961  26,411  33,272  19,702  6,601 103,442  491,277  594,719 
World  2,798 761,953  292,119  85,660 594,941 284,418  140,963  41,255  229,652 189,393  110,110  32,447 642,885 2,122,824 2,765,709 
           Share of Intra-Regional Trade in All Goods from Importer (%)           
Cambodia  0 15.0  13.9  2.6  2.2  4.0  3.1  0.2  8.5  9.3 25.6 15.6 55.6  44.4  100.0 
China  0.0  0  35.7  1.8 21.9 16.9  2.5  1.1  5.4 11.2  2.5  0.9 14.3  85.7  100.0 
Hong  Kong,  China  0.2 50.1  0  0.6 14.5  6.3  3.3  1.3  8.7 12.4  2.5  0.1 16.8  83.2  100.0 
Indonesia  0.0 14.8  2.2  0 16.3  8.9  5.9  0.8  39.1  4.1  7.0  0.8 53.6  46.4  100.0 
Japan  0.0  40.3  7.4  8.7  0  11.5  6.3  3.5  6.0 7.0 7.2 2.1  33.8  66.2  100.0 
Korea,  Rep.  0.0 29.7  5.5  6.0 39.5  0  4.0  1.2  6.8  4.7  1.9  0.6 20.5  79.5  100.0 
Malaysia  0.0 13.7  3.1  4.4 16.2  6.0  0  3.2  39.3  5.4  7.4  1.3 55.6  44.4  100.0 
Philippines  0.0 13.7  7.7  4.1 26.4  9.4  5.8  0  12.2 12.3  6.0  2.4 30.5  69.5  100.0 
Singapore  0.0 17.0  6.2  8.0 18.8  7.5  22.4  2.8  0  7.8  7.6  2.0 42.7  57.3  100.0 
Taiwan,  China  0.0 16.8  6.9  2.5 44.2 11.0  4.0  1.9  9.1  0  2.7  0.9 21.2  78.8  100.0 
Thailand  0.0 12.7  4.9  3.6 36.4  5.5  12.3  1.9  15.3  6.0  0  1.4 34.5  65.5  100.0 
Vietnam  0.2 20.9  4.8  2.5 13.3 12.7  4.3  1.2  16.4 15.0  8.7  0 33.2  66.8  100.0 
ASEAN  0.0 15.1  4.8  4.4 21.0  7.6  10.1  2.0  19.7  7.4  6.3  1.6 44.1  55.9  100.0 
NE  Asia  0.1 25.0  15.3  3.4 19.9 10.8  3.8  1.7  6.8  8.8  3.4  0.9 20.2  79.8  100.0 
East Asia (12)  0.1  22.5  12.6  3.7  20.2  10.0  5.4  1.8  10.1  8.5  4.1  1.1  26.3  73.7  100.0 
EU  (27)  0.1 34.2  10.1  2.4 20.6 10.4  3.9  1.6  6.6  5.2  3.5  1.3 19.5  80.5  100.0 
LAC  (13)  0.2 32.3  8.9  1.9 26.6  9.2  5.0  1.3  4.4  5.6  3.3  1.1 17.4  82.6  100.0 
World  0.1 27.6  10.6  3.1 21.5 10.3  5.1  1.5  8.3  6.8  4.0  1.2 23.2  76.8  100.0   23 
 Cont. Table 5                              
Partner (Importer)  Cambodia  China 
Hong 
Kong Indonesia  Japan Korea  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Taiwan  Thailand  Vietnam  ASEAN  NE Asia  E Asia-12 
             Trade Balance in All Goods ($ million)               
Cambodia  0 509  488  93  -27 138  101  6  203 326  883 395  1,682 1,434 3,115 
China  -328  0  -4,540  819  -28,403  23,267  -3,871  943  -759  20,951 -2,024 -2,653 -7,873  11,275  3,402 
Hong  Kong,  China  206  112,248  0  1,201 34,389 13,488  5,390  1,319  17,314 28,834  4,626  -882 29,175  188,960  218,134 
Indonesia  -77 -87 -659  0  -11,603  -3,139  -1,052  -616  11,656  -2,202 832  -231  10,510  -17,689  -7,179 
Japan  -59 -16,421  -17,732  11,143  0 -24,376  -3,450  -1,258  -6,702 -31,460 -11,020  266 -11,079  -89,988  -101,068 
Korea,  Rep.  -74  -41,713  -6,723  4,217  22,215  0  -946  -995  -548 -7,629 -1,622 -2,930 -2,899  -33,849  -36,748 
Malaysia  -68 -9,487  -4,935  1,283 -2,138 -1,403  0  608  3,050 -1,039  -2,404  -228  2,242  -19,003  -16,761 
Philippines  -2  -8,182  -2,506  1,097 1,357  904 -1,246  0  -464 1,435  168  619  172  -6,992  -6,820 
Singapore  -132  118  -11,374  -1,634  11,741 2,089  8,594  -1,158  0 2,716 2,078  -2,565 5,183  5,289  10,473 
Taiwan,  China  -239  -58,131 -14,874  1,134  25,514 2,813 -2,419  -1,754  -4,347  0 -1,808  -3,369  -12,802 -44,677 -57,479 
Thailand  -214  -6,173  -3,049  -1,201  6,893  692  1,544  -510  1,888  851  0  -1,511  -3 -786 -790 
Vietnam  -126 3,091  809  239  -952 2,738  139  -523  2,604 3,368 1,464  0 3,798  9,053  12,851 
ASEAN -620  -20,211  -21,227  -122  5,271  2,018  8,080  -2,192  18,937  5,454  3,022  -3,521  23,584  -28,695  -5,111 
NE  Asia  -495 -4,016 -43,869  18,514  53,715  15,193  -5,296  -1,744  4,959  10,697  -11,848 -9,569 -5,479  31,720  26,241 
East Asia (12)  -1,114  -79,390  -65,096  18,102  58,986  17,211  1,768  -3,936  23,896  16,151  -10,195  -13,090  15,431  -52,138  -36,707 
EU  (27)  492 71,641  20,169  4,488 28,976 16,940  3,260  3,121  4,612  4,599  4,211  2,950 23,135  142,325  165,460 
LAC  (13)  1,384  110,889 34,689  5,809  69,776  14,849  13,045  -2,280  552 7,622 8,528 5,082  32,121  237,825  269,946 
World  735  102,001  -8,042  27,959  79,074  23,183 26,379  -8,233  29,602  7,801 -8,054 -4,314  64,074 204,017 268,092 
             Trade Intensity Index of Exports in All Goods             
Cambodia  0 1.8  4.3  2.8 0.3 1.3  2.0  0.5  3.4 4.5  21.2  43.8 7.9  1.9  3.3 
China  0.1  0  8.2  1.4 2.5 4.0  1.2  1.8  1.6 3.9 1.5 1.8 1.5  2.7  2.4 
Hong  Kong,  China  7.1 5.3  0  0.6 2.0 1.8  1.9  2.6  3.0 5.3 1.8 0.4 2.1  3.2  2.9 
Indonesia  0.1 1.5  0.6  0 2.1 2.4  3.2  1.6  13.1 1.7 4.9 2.0 6.4  1.7  2.8 
Japan  0.2 2.7  1.3  5.1  0 2.1  2.3  4.3  1.3 1.9 3.3 3.3 2.7  1.6  1.8 
Korea,  Rep.  0.4 2.3  1.1  4.1 3.9  0  1.7  1.7  1.7 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.9  2.2  2.1 
Malaysia  0.3 1.3  0.8  3.8 2.0 1.5  0  5.6  12.5 2.1 4.9 3.0 6.3  1.5  2.6 
Philippines  0.2 1.2  1.8  3.4 3.1 2.3  2.8  0  3.7 4.5 3.8 5.2 3.3  2.3  2.5 
Singapore  0.2 1.4  1.3  5.8 2.0 1.6  9.9  4.1  0 2.6 4.3 3.7 4.1  1.7  2.2 
Taiwan,  China  0.0 0.8  0.8  1.0 2.6 1.4  1.0  1.6  1.4  0  0.9 1.0 1.2  1.3  1.3 
Thailand  0.7 1.1  1.1  2.9 4.2 1.3  6.0  3.2  4.6 2.2  0 3.0 3.7  2.1  2.5 
Vietnam  4.5 2.2  1.3  2.4 1.8 3.6  2.4  2.2  5.7 6.4  6.4  0 4.1  2.5  2.9 
ASEAN  0.9 2.1  1.7  5.4 3.7 2.8  7.5  5.1  9.1 4.1 6.0 5.1 7.2  2.8  3.8 
NE  Asia  3.9 5.5  8.8  6.7 5.6 6.4  4.5  7.0  5.0 7.8 5.2 4.7 5.3  6.3  6.1 
East  Asia  (12)  3.2 4.8  7.0  7.0 5.5 5.7  6.2  7.1  7.2 7.3 6.1 5.5 6.6  5.6  5.9 
EU  (27)  1.7 1.6  1.2  1.0 1.2 1.3  1.0  1.4  1.0 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.1  1.3  1.3 
LAC  (13)  4.4 2.2  1.6  1.2 2.3 1.7  1.8  1.7  1.0 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.4  2.0  1.9 
Notes: EU(27) includes European Union 25 members plus new members of Bulgaria and Romania.         
           LAC(13) includes LAIA(11) countries plus Canada and United States.               
                        
Source: Computations based on UN COMTRADE Statistics.                  24 
Table 6: Matrix of Latin American Trade in All Goods, 2005                     
                                
                     Exporting Country                               
Partner 
(Importer)   Argentina 
 
Bolivia   Brazil    Chile  
 
Colombia   Ecuador   Mexico 
 




Venezuela  Canada USA ANDEAN  Mercosur 
 
LAIA(11)   NAFTA LAC(13) 
               Export Value in All Goods ($ million)                   
Argentina  0  264  9,912  626  47  42 672  102 54 267  18 144  4,100  425  10,281  12,004 4,916  16,248 
Bolivia  380 0  579  211  50  8 37  22  155  5  5 13  218 218 985  1,451  268  1,683 
Brazil  6,328  1,016  0  1,729  141  89 890  312  453 458  187 912  15,345  1,887  7,099  11,605  17,147  27,862 
Chile  4,497 41  3,611  0  296  301 668  30  1,129  83  103 340  5,198  1,871  8,221  10,759 6,206  16,297 
Colombia  361 179 1,405  347  0  471 1,548  2  347  14  1,013  369 5,415  2,010  1,780  5,686  7,333  11,470 
Ecuador  265  3 644  341  1,324  0 309  7  295  10  296 132  1,979  1,919  926  3,495 2,420 5,606 
Mexico 1,158  20  4,062  1,582  611  58  0  5  332  139  470  2,690  120,048  1,491  5,363  8,436  122,738  131,174 
Paraguay  509 22 960 40  2  1  14  0  0  56  4  8 896  29  1,525  1,609  918 2,512 
Peru  599  126 932  725  710  869 345  20  0  37  151 218  2,289  1,856  1,588  4,514 2,853 7,021 
Uruguay  862 2  848  72  7  3 66 451 7  0  1 20  354  20  2,161  2,318  439  2,692 
Venezuela  510 159 2,214  359  2,098  122 1,289  9  299  33  0  567 6,408  2,677  2,767  7,091  8,264  14,066 
USA+Canada  4,865  428  24,657  7,317  9,150  5,001 188,072  58  6,279  876  24,645 302,204 211,417  45,503  30,457  271,350  701,693  784,971 
ANDEAN  2,114 466 5,773  1,983  4,182  1,470 3,528  60  1,095  99  1,466 1,300  16,310  8,680  8,046  22,237  21,138  39,847 
MERCOSUR  7,699 1,305 11,720 2,467  197  135  1,642  865  514  781  211  1,084 20,695  2,361  21,066  27,536  23,421  49,314 
LAIA  (11)  15,467  1,832  25,166  6,032  5,286  1,964 5,838  960  3,070 1,103  2,249 5,414  162,250 14,402 42,696  68,967  173,503  236,632 
NAFTA  6,023  448  28,719  8,899  9,761  5,059 188,072  63  6,611  1,015  25,115 304,894 331,465  46,994  35,820  279,786  824,431  916,145 
LAC  (13)  20,333  2,260  49,823 13,349  14,436  6,965 193,910  1,018  9,349  1,979  26,894 307,618 373,667  59,905  73,153  340,317  875,196 1,021,602 
World  40,106  2,797 116,129 38,596  21,190  9,869 214,207  1,626 17,114  3,405  55,487 360,136 904,339  106,459  161,265  520,527 1,478,683 1,785,002 
             Share of Intra-Regional Trade in All Goods from Importer (%)               
Argentina  0  1.6  61.0  3.9  0.3  0.3 4.1  0.6  0.3 1.6  0.1 0.9  25.2  2.6 63.3  73.9  30.3  100.0 
Bolivia  22.6 0  34.4  12.5  3.0  0.5 2.2  1.3  9.2 0.3  0.3 0.8  13.0 13.0 58.6  86.2  16.0  100.0 
Brazil  22.7  3.6  0  6.2  0.5  0.3 3.2  1.1  1.6 1.6  0.7 3.3  55.1  6.8 25.5  41.7  61.5  100.0 
Chile  27.6  0.3  22.2  0  1.8  1.8 4.1  0.2  6.9 0.5  0.6 2.1  31.9 11.5 50.4  66.0  38.1  100.0 
Colombia  3.1 1.6 12.2 3.0  0  4.1 13.5  0.0 3.0  0.1  8.8  3.2 47.2  17.5  15.5  49.6  63.9  100.0 
Ecuador  4.7  0.1  11.5  6.1 23.6  0 5.5  0.1  5.3 0.2  5.3 2.4  35.3 34.2 16.5  62.3  43.2  100.0 
Mexico  0.9  0.0 3.1  1.2  0.5  0.0  0  0.0  0.3 0.1  0.4 2.1  91.5  1.1  4.1  6.4  93.6  100.0 
Paraguay  20.3  0.9  38.2  1.6  0.1  0.0 0.6  0  0.0 2.2  0.2 0.3  35.6  1.2 60.7  64.0  36.5  100.0 
Peru  8.5  1.8  13.3  10.3 10.1 12.4 4.9  0.3  0 0.5  2.2 3.1  32.6 26.4 22.6  64.3  40.6  100.0 
Uruguay  32.0  0.1  31.5  2.7  0.3  0.1 2.4 16.8  0.2  0  0.1 0.7  13.1  0.7 80.3  86.1  16.3  100.0 
Venezuela  3.6  1.1  15.7  2.5 14.9  0.9 9.2  0.1  2.1 0.2  0 4.0  45.6 19.0 19.7  50.4  58.8  100.0 
USA+Canada  0.6 0.1  3.1 0.9  1.2  0.6 24.0  0.0 0.8  0.1  3.1 38.5 26.9  5.8  3.9  34.6  89.4  100.0 
ANDEAN  5.3  1.2  14.5  5.0 10.5  3.7 8.9  0.2  2.7 0.2  3.7 3.3  40.9 21.8 20.2  55.8  53.0  100.0 
MERCOSUR  15.6  2.6  23.8  5.0  0.4  0.3 3.3  1.8  1.0 1.6  0.4 2.2  42.0  4.8 42.7  55.8  47.5  100.0 
LAIA  (11)  6.5  0.8  10.6  2.5  2.2  0.8 2.5  0.4  1.3 0.5  1.0 2.3  68.6  6.1 18.0  29.1  73.3  100.0 
NAFTA  0.7 0.0  3.1 1.0  1.1  0.6 20.5  0.0 0.7  0.1  2.7 33.3 36.2  5.1  3.9  30.5  90.0  100.0 
LAC  (13)  2.0 0.2  4.9 1.3  1.4  0.7 19.0  0.1 0.9  0.2  2.6 30.1 36.6  5.9  7.2  33.3  85.7  100.0 
World  2.2 0.2  6.5 2.2  1.2  0.6 12.0  0.1 1.0  0.2  3.1 20.2 50.7  6.0  9.0  29.2  82.8  100.0   25 
 Cont. Table 6                                     
Partner 
(Importer)   Argentina 
 
Bolivia   Brazil    Chile  
 
Colombia   Ecuador   Mexico 
 




Venezuela Canada  USA  ANDEAN Mercosur 
 
LAIA(11)   NAFTA  LAC(13) 
               Trade Balance in All Goods ($ million)                 
Argentina 0  -127  3,324  -4,178  -364  -304  -631  -560  -671  -519  -386 -230 -472  -1,852 2,245  -4,416 -1,332 -5,118 
Bolivia  80  0  -593  173 -142  5  7  12 47  3  -205  -7 -75 -295 -497  -612  -75  -695 
Brazil  -4,297  503  0  -2,069  -1,242  -596 -4,324  -547  -575  -366  -1,808 -1,685 -9,091  -3,718  -5,211  -15,321  -15,100  -26,097 
Chile  3,825 -122  1,838  0  -81  -109 -1,086  -9  514  14  -226 -1,033 -1,467  -24  5,668  4,558  -3,587  2,058 
Colombia 304  121  1,253  3  0  -912  873  -1  -426  12  -1,384  -112  -3,431  -2,601  1,568  -157  -2,669  -3,700 
Ecuador  202 -9 548 70  795  0 203  7  -619  8  141  37  -3,780  308  764  1,346  -3,539  -2,397 
Mexico 419  -31  3,185  820  -1,146  -245  0  -12  -32  89  -1,074  -9,357  -50,146  -2,528  3,681  1,973  -59,502  -57,530 
Paraguay  54 -1 631  -77  -9  -4  5  0  -82  36  -31  -4 844  -126  720  523  845 1,363 
Peru  545 -26  456  -382  360  504 -100  19  0  32  -108 -903  -2,831  730 1,051 1,299 -3,835 -2,436 
Uruguay 303  -4  338  -29  -21  -49  -197  388  -40 0 -45  -88  -378  -158  1,030  645  -664  179 
Venezuela 474  120  1,925  223  878  -328  505  1  -230  -211  0  -943  -27,556  440  2,188  3,356  -27,994  -25,143 
USA+Canada  247  87 10,131 2,203  2,727  3,041 62,930  -58 3,849  594  17,509  121,607  -76,375  27,212  10,914  103,258  108,161  148,490 
ANDEAN  1,605 205 3,589  86  1,892  -731 1,488  37  -1,229  -157  -1,556  -1,928  -37,673  -1,418  5,074  5,231 -38,112 -34,370 
MERCOSUR  -3,940  372  4,293  -6,353  -1,636  -954 -5,147  -719  -1,367  -850  -2,269 -2,007 -9,097  -5,854  -1,216  -18,570  -16,251  -29,674 
LAIA  (11)  1,910  425  12,905 -5,446  -971  -2,038  -4,745  -703 -2,114  -905  -5,126 -14,324 -98,383  -9,825  13,207  -6,808  -117,453  -119,516 
NAFTA  666  56 13,316 3,023  1,581  2,795 62,930  -71 3,817  682  16,435  112,250 
-
126,521 24,684 14,594  105,231  48,659  90,960 
LAC  (13)  2,157  511 23,037  -3,243  1,756  1,002 58,185  -762 1,735  -311  12,383  107,282 
-
174,758 17,387 24,121  96,450  -9,291  28,973 
World  11,418  454 39,693 8,738  -14  261  -7,612  -1,472 4,612  -474  33,639 45,700 
-
766,390  38,952 49,165  89,244  -728,301  -631,446 
               Trade Intensity Index of Exports in All Goods                 
Argentina  --  37.0  33.4  6.4  0.9  1.7 1.2 24.5  1.2  30.7  0.1 0.2 1.8  1.6 25.0  9.0  1.3  3.6 
Bolivia  46.2 --  24.3  26.6 11.5  4.0 0.8 67.3  44.2 6.6  0.5 0.2 1.2 10.0 29.8  13.6  0.9  4.6 
Brazil  22.4  51.6  --  6.4  0.9  1.3 0.6 27.3  3.8  19.1  0.5 0.4 2.4  2.5  6.2  3.2  1.6  2.2 
Chile  41.0  5.3  11.4 --  5.1 11.2 1.1  6.6  24.1 8.9  0.7 0.3 2.1  6.4 18.6  7.6  1.5  3.3 
Colombia  4.8  34.2 6.5  4.8  -- 25.6 3.9  0.5  10.8 2.1  9.8 0.5 3.2 10.1  5.9  5.8  2.7  3.4 
Ecuador  7.7  1.3 6.5  10.4 73.4  -- 1.7  5.1  20.3 3.6  6.3 0.4 2.6 21.2  6.7  7.9  1.9  3.7 
Mexico  1.6  0.4 2.0  2.3  1.6  0.3  --  0.2  1.1 2.3  0.5 0.4 7.5  0.8  1.9  0.9  4.7  4.1 
Paraguay  38.1  23.8  24.8  3.1  0.3  0.2 0.2  --  0.1  49.3  0.2 0.1 3.0  0.8 28.4  9.3  1.9  4.2 
Peru  14.4  43.3 7.7  18.0 32.2 84.6 1.5 11.7  --  10.5  2.6 0.6 2.4 16.8  9.5  8.3  1.9  3.8 
Uruguay  50.8  1.4  17.3  4.4  0.8  0.8 0.7  656.0  0.9  --  0.1 0.1 0.9  0.4 31.7  10.5  0.7  3.6 
Venezuela  6.1  27.0 9.1  4.4 47.2  5.9 2.9  2.7  8.3 4.7  -- 0.8 3.4 12.0  8.2  6.5  2.7  3.8 
USA+Canada  0.9  1.2 1.6  1.5  3.3  3.9 6.8  0.3  2.8 2.0  3.4 6.5 1.8  3.3  1.5  4.0  3.7  3.4 
ANDEAN  8.7  27.5 8.2  8.5 32.6 24.6 2.7  6.1  10.6 4.8  4.4 0.6 3.0 13.5  8.2  7.0  2.4  3.7 
MERCOSUR  18.5  45.1 9.7  6.2  0.9  1.3 0.7 51.4  2.9  22.2  0.4 0.3 2.2  2.1 12.6  5.1  1.5  2.7 
LAIA  (11)  10.4  17.7 5.9  4.2  6.8  5.4 0.7 16.0  4.9 8.8  1.1 0.4 4.9  3.7  7.2  3.6  3.2  3.6 
NAFTA  1.3  1.4 2.1  2.0  4.0  4.4 7.6  0.3  3.3 2.6  3.9 7.3 3.2  3.8  1.9  4.6  4.8  4.4 
LAC  (13)  4.4  7.0 3.7  3.0  5.9  6.1 7.8  5.4  4.7 5.0  4.2 7.4 3.6  4.9  3.9  5.7  5.1  5.0 
                                
Source: Computations based on COMTRADE Statistics.                           26
 
Yet another way to examine the characteristics of recent regional trade agreements is 
to note that one of the important motives of the so-called “New Regionalism”, particularly for 
smaller economies, is to design rules to attract more foreign direct investment and to 
strengthen institutions in order to participate in global and regional production sharing (Ethier 
1998, Salazar-Xirinachs 2005). Thus one way to evaluate the performance of FTAs of East 
Asian and Latin American countries is to examine the competitiveness of East Asian and 
Latin American countries in items such as components and parts, using the revealed 











RCA =  
 
where j indicates the product value and k home country. Xjk and Xwk represent the product 
value of j exported by country k and the world; Xk and Xw are total exports of j by country k 
and the world. If the index has a value greater than one, country k has a comparative 
advantage in the production of product j. If the index has a value smaller than one, the 
industry of the country has a comparative disadvantage.  
 
Suppose we go further and differentiate the RCA index for exports from that for 
imports.  When the RCA index is greater than 1 for exports of components and parts,
8 we can 
reasonably argue that the economy has a comparative advantage in “processing”.  When the 
RCA index is greater than 1 for imports, we say that the economy has comparative advantage 
in “assembly”.  The RCA indices for East Asian and Latin American imports and exports of 







                                                           
8 The list of products that are classified as components and parts is available upon request. The list is compiled 
from the UN COMTRADE statistics by the authors.   27
Table 7: The Percentage of Parts and Components Products with Comparative Advantage 
in East Asian Countries         
         
      Exports - Production Operations     Imports - Assembly Operations 
        ( % of Products with RCA > 1)      ( % of Products with RCA > 1) 
Country 1985  1995  2005  1985  1995  2005 
Cambodia ..  ..  2.7  ..  ..  6.7 
China 12.0  20.0  30.7 40.0  44.0  34.7 
Hong Kong, China  25.3  22.7 33.3  41.3 44.0  36.0 
Indonesia 0.0  8.0  9.3 58.7  50.7  42.7 
Japan 40.0  46.7  42.7 6.7 8.0  16.0 
Korea Rep.  10.7  16.0 26.7  28.0 37.3  21.3 
Malaysia 8.0  13.3  20.0 52.0  36.0  37.3 
Philippines 5.3  4.0 17.3  34.7 36.0  25.3 
Singapore 18.7  20.0  34.7 36.0  41.3  41.3 
Taiwan, China  34.7  22.7 34.7  40.0 44.0  21.3 
Thailand 10.7  20.0  24.0 33.3  41.3  29.3 
Vietnam ..  1.3  12.0  ..  4.0  25.3 
Average ASEAN  8.5  11.1 17.1  42.9 34.9  29.7 
Average NE Asia  24.5  25.6 33.6  31.2 35.5  25.9 
Average above all East Asia 16.5  17.7  24.0  37.1 35.2  28.1 
Average above excluding Japan 13.9  14.8  22.3  40.4 37.9  29.2 
                 
Memo Items: Comparators               
Canada 17.3  20.0  24.0 76.0  52.0  53.3 
United States  61.3  64.0 54.7  37.3 38.7  33.3 
Germany 70.7  65.3  62.7 45.3  36.0  50.7 
Mexico 12.0  22.7  29.3 66.7  41.3  38.7 
           
Notes: Percentages based on the 75 products of parts and components from textiles & clothing and 
           machinery & equipment at SITC 4/5-digit level in Revision 2.       
           Due to the missing data, the 1995 data for Vietnam is replaced by 1997.     
        





  From Table 7, it is clear that East Asian revealed comparative advantage in processed 
exports of components and parts has been gaining over the years, starting way back from 
1985.  The percentage of products that the East Asian economies have comparative advantage 
in assembly has declined over time.  The results for Latin America are given in Table 8.     28
 
Table 8: The Percentage of Parts and Components Products with Comparative Advantage 
in Latin American Countries            
            
       Exports - Production Operations       Imports - Assembly Operations 
        ( % of Products with RCA > 1)        ( % of Products with RCA > 1) 
Country  1985 1995  2005 1985  1995  2005
Argentina   1.3  9.3  10.7 32.0  36.0  38.7
Bolivia   0.0  0.0  2.7 44.0  22.7  24.0
Brazil   6.7  14.7  18.7 28.0  34.7  49.3
Chile   1.3  0.0  0.0 40.0  33.3  26.7
Colombia   4.0  4.0 4.0  30.7  34.7 32.0
Ecuador   0.0  1.3  0.0 45.3  34.7  25.3
Mexico   17.3  22.7  29.3 62.7  41.3  38.7
Paraguay   0.0  0.0 1.3  29.3  17.3 13.3
Peru   2.7  1.3  1.3 48.0  34.7  33.3
Uruguay   4.0  4.0  5.3 14.7  26.7  22.7
Venezuela   0.0  0.0  0.0 57.3  37.3  36.0
United States  61.3  64.0 54.7  37.3 38.7  33.3
Canada 17.3  20.0  24.0 76.0  52.0  53.3
Average ANDEAN  1.3  1.3 1.6  45.1  32.8 30.1
Average MERCOSUR  3.0  7.0 9.0  26.0  28.7 31.0
Average above Latin America (LAIA) 3.4  5.2  6.7 39.3  32.1  30.9
Average LAIA excluding Mexico 2.0  3.5  4.4 36.9  31.2  30.1
Average NAFTA  32.0  35.6 36.0  58.7 44.0  41.8
Average above all countries (LAC) 8.9  10.9  11.7 41.9  34.2  32.8
                 
Memo Items: Comparators               
China 12.0  20.0  30.7 40.0  44.0  34.7
Korea Rep.  10.7  16.0 26.7  28.0 37.3  21.3
Malaysia 8.0  13.3  20.0 52.0  36.0  37.3
East Asia (12) average  16.5 17.7  24.0 37.1 35.2  28.1
          
Notes: Percentages based on the 75 products of parts and components from textiles & clothing and 
           machinery & equipment at SITC 4/5-digit level in Revision 2.       
           Due to the missing data, the 1985 data for Mexico is used 1986.       
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Except for Mexico and, in a lesser extent, Brazil, that show a rising comparative 
advantage in processing, other Latin American economies have not shown significant 
increases in the percentage of components and parts that they have comparative advantage.  
Our result from this section is as follows: 
 
East Asia has more intense integration with itself compared to the case of Latin 
America.  East Asia also has a growing comparative advantage in the processing of 
exports of components and parts. 
 
Notwithstanding the recent regionalism in East Asia and the absence of a regional 
trade arrangement for the whole region, intra-regional-trade has expanded rapidly 
and has been deeper compared to Latin America. 
 
 
4.  A Simple Bargaining Analysis of the Implementation of Regional 
Trade Agreements 
 
  In our discussions of East Asian regional as well as Latin American regional 
agreements, it is clear that trade policies as well as regional trade agreements often serve at 
least two purposes.  One on hand, trade and trade agreements are about promoting economic 
growth and development.  This objective is thus economic.  One the other hand, trade 
agreements are often done with foreign policy goals in mind.  For example, analysts often 
point out that both Japan and China are jockeying for positions of political and diplomatic 
influence when they attempt to form bilateral trade deals in Asia, including their interest in 
ASEAN.  Similarly, Brazil is often seen to be using their position in MERCUSOR to thwart 
the power of the United States in Latin America (Jose M. Salazar-Xirinachs 2005).  Indeed, in 
most countries, trade policy formulations and implementations include representatives of 
foreign policy interests (Barfield 2005).  Furthermore, within economic interests, as we can 
see from our discussion of the early form of trade agreements in Latin America, some trade 
agreements are inward-looking, while others are outward-oriented. Thus implementations of 
regional trade agreements will depend on the internal bargaining of various objectives.   
 
  Suppose we take the example of how trade policies are implemented in a particular 
East Asian country, say Japan.  Japan’s trade policy formulation and implementation are the   30
responsibilities are several Ministries, in particular, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 
and The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), with the overall coordination 
responsibility being shouldered by the Cabinet (WTO 2007).  When the WTO was 
established, Japan was not a member of any of the then existing 62 formal regional trade 
agreements (Sapir 1998, Mavroidis 2005). Japan now has several formal bilateral trade 
agreements, including agreements with Singapore, Mexico and Malaysia.   
 
According to Aoki (1988), policy implementation and formulation (including trade 
policies) in Japan can be seen as a bargaining of the various Ministries. Furthermore, certain 
bureaus of each Ministry (genkyoku) maintain contact with their constituents and the Ministry 
can be understood to be maximizing a weighted sum of the interests of its constituents as well 
as the national interest.  The argument for this view is that when the bureaucrats from each 
Ministry retire, they often will “descend from the heaven” (amakudari) and obtain high 
positions in the private sector, usually in the constituents’ industries.  While this aspect of 
industry-government linkage has been weakened in recent years, nonetheless it still exists and 
is a strong reason for the Ministries to pay attention to the interests of their constituents.  At 
the same time, each Ministry cannot stray too often and too far from the national interest or it 
risks the loss of reputation within the government and among the public. Generally MOFA 
can be viewed as paying particular attention to the diplomatic and security interests of Japan, 
while METI is viewed as paying special attention to the economic and international trade 
interests of the country.  The implicit bargaining of these two Ministries, together with the 
participation and coordination of other government entities, will decide how trade policies and 
regional trade agreements will be implemented. 
 
To simplify our analysis, suppose trade policy formulation is represented in a model of 
generalized Nash bargaining game.  The policymaker is the Nashian arbitrator maximizing a 
weighted sum of the economic and foreign policy interests (the interests of MOFA and METI, 
respectively).  We further assume for simplicity the overall national interests can be subsumed 
within the economic and the foreign policy objectives.  Then we can write down the 
maximization of the national objective N of a country, say Japan, is: 
 
 Max  N=  (E-E
0)
 a (F-F
0) b   
     t   31
where N is the national objective, E represents the economic interest, F is the foreign policy 
goal, a is the bargaining power of the economic interest (as ultimately represented in the 
implementation of the regional trade agreement by economic agents such as traders, 
exporters, retailers which import cheaper import goods, etc), and b is the bargaining power of 
the foreign policy establishments.  E
0 and F
0 are the respective threat points of the economic 
and foreign policy interests.  There may be a formally agreed (via a de jure trade treaty) trade 
instrument T, but the effective trade policy to be implemented in each country is actually t, the 
policy instrument to be bargained by various groups within each country.  This can be 
something transparent such as foreign investment policy or a more opaque instrument such as 
a trade facilitation policy (custom procedure, technical standards, etc.). 
 
  We can further assume that within the economic interests, the interests of trade 
agreement implementations can be divided into two camps: the interests of the inward-
looking group M and the interests of the outward-looking group X.  The three parties form the 
negotiated national objective function of: 
 










0 are the respective threat points for the inward-looking group and the 
outward-looking group.  For example, in the earlier periods, when Japan’s METI was 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), the powerful agency that was focused on 
industrial policy implementations, the outward-looking economic interests can be interpreted 
as the interests of the exporters, while the inward-looking economic interests represent the 
constituents who wanted to restrict imports and restrict inward direct investment (Noland and 
Pack 2003). All the interests of the parties are related to the effectively implemented trade 
policy instrument t.  It is assumed that M increases with an increase in t (i.e. the interests of 
the inward-looking group rise with a rise in protection).  X decreases with a rise in protection, 
while F can vary for a country located in different regions at different periods.  In East Asia, 
foreign policy interests tend to be more pro-trade, so there is a sense that F rises with a lower 
t.  In other cases, a component of foreign policy may be to go against open trade, particularly 
U.S.-led regional trade agreements. In that case, F rises with an increase in protection, at least 
for some range of t.  
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  In essence, we assume that if there is a formal regional trade contract which 
establishes the formal trade policy instrument T, it is an incomplete contract. An incomplete 
trade contract is one where it cannot specify all contingencies.  Regional trade dispute 
settlement can help, but even there the process is slow and can be inconsistent. Thus national 
governments have the leeway to implement trade instruments to various degrees of openness. 
In effect, we assume that the implemented trade policy, t, can be higher or lower. The 
implementation process is decided by internal bargaining of various groups within the 
country.  As is well-known the generalized Nash bargaining formulation can be 
mathematically derived from a more detailed bargaining process (Binmore, Rubinstein and 
Wolinsky 1986).  The bargaining power of each party depends on how patient the party is 
able to be while waiting out an impasse, how averse the party is to the risk of a collapse of an 
agreement and what alternative is available to the party in the event that the bargaining breaks 
down.  Given that East Asia already has a deep degree of trade integration via the market, we 
can argue that the bargaining power of the outward-oriented group is high. Furthermore, given 
that the foreign policy establishments in East Asia tend to be pro-exports (as e.g. under 
MOFA), an active role played by the foreign policy interests will tend to coincide with the 
outward-oriented interests. Assuming that we have an unique maximum for N and that t* 
solves the maximization, we have  
 
 dN/dt=0  or 
  arg max N = t*  
 
Furthermore, we have dt*/d(am) >0,  dt*/d (ax) <0.  For an East Asian economy where 
foreign interests generally are pro-trade, dt*/db<0.  For a country whose foreign policy 
interests are anti-trade, we have dt*/db>0. 
 
In internal deliberations concerning how the trade agreement should be implemented, 
the various parties attempt to reach an agreement. These three sets of interests may go against 
each other and the internal equilibrium may break down. The threat points and the bargaining 
power of each party will determine which direction the implementation of the regional trade 
agreement may go.
9 For example, it may be to the nation’s outward-oriented economic 
advantage to be welcoming foreign direct investment.  However to the inward-looking group 
and to some foreign policy analysts, this may represent a loss of influence and sovereignty.  
                                                           
9 For an application to trade negotiations, see Fung, Iizaka, Lin and Ng (2004).   33
Even for the case of Japan, liberalization of inward foreign direct investment is effectively a 
relatively recent event (Noland and Pack 2003). 
 
If the economy is already fairly integrated with other regional trading partners via the 
market first, there is a thick group of outward-looking economic interests (such as exporters, 
traders, shippers, etc) that may raise the bargaining power of the outward-looking open-trade 
economic constituency (an increase in ax). This will tilt the implementation of the trade 
agreement in favor of pursuing further liberalization in response to the correct market signal. 
If however, there is only limited market integration and the inward-looking and certain types 
of foreign policy interests dominate (an increase in am and an increase in b of the 
protectionist foreign policy interests), then the regional agreement will in actually not be 
implemented for economic integration.  Instead it will be used mainly as a tool for import-
substitution and nationalistic foreign policy objectives. This simple analysis can thus be used 
to highlight why developing first a network of traders and exporters may help generate a more 
outward-looking economically friendly outcome.
10 This may help explain why by integrating 
via markets and by pursuing policies that are generally business-friendly and foreign direct 
investment-friendly (even though formal regional trade agreements had been absent), East and 
Southeast Asia has been able to generate a deeper degree of regional integration in practice. 
 
Our result from this section can be summarized as: 
 
Integrating via the markets first and engaging in formal trade agreements later seem to be 
the better economic and trade policy sequence.  One reason this is the case is because this 
sequence can enhance the internal bargaining power of the outward-looking trade 
interests first, which may tilt the implementation of the formal regional trade agreement to 
be more market-friendly.    
                                                           
10 A much more familiar argument for having a formal trade agreement when there is already substantially a lot 
of trade is that this is less likely to generate trade diversion.  For details, see e.g. Winters (1999).   34
5.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we examine the two channels of regional integration: integration of 
markets vs. integration by agreements.  Since East Asia and Latin America are two regions 
where preferential trade agreements have proliferated in recent years, we utilize the 
experiences of these two areas to illustrate our results.  We have four related results in this 
paper. First, East Asia started their integration by primarily using the markets, then by the 
1990s, the region started to turn to more formal agreements. Complementary policies in the 
drive for integration via the markets include business-friendly and FDI-friendly policies as 
well as domestic policies such as improvement of the infrastructure. Latin America, on the 
other hand, has relied mainly on formal, de jure regional agreements for integration. Second, 
using a variety of indicators, it seems that at least in terms of the extent of intra-regional 
integrations and in terms of advancing comparative advantage in the processing of 
components and parts, East and Southeast Asia has been more successful. Third, if the main 
objective is regional trade integration, then it seems that the proper sequencing of the two 
forms of integration is first to develop integration via the markets before engaging in more 
formal agreements. Lastly, an argument in favor of this sequence is that by developing the 
lobbying clout of the outward-looking economic and trade interests first, this will enhance the 
internal bargaining power of the outward-oriented constituency in the internal bargaining of 
trade policy, thereby tilting the implementation of the regional trade agreement to be more in 
line with the market signals.     35
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